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Introduction 
In 1997 Indonesia was hit by a severe financial crisis which led to the change of 
almost everything in the country, including the exchange rate regime; from managed 
floating to free floating or flexible exchange rate. It has been a major conclusion from 
academic debate that maintaining exchange rate at a certain level or band (soft peg) was 
no longer workable in the more integrated financial system, international market, and 
free flow of capital mobility across economy.  
Indonesia once was known as one of the “Asian Tigers” which were believed to be 
the next industrialized economies as was being indicated by astounding macroeconomic 
performance since the early 1990s. The exchange rate management, in which the 
objective was to have a competitiveness in the international market, was making a huge 
contribution to that performance. No one suspected those countries would be hit by the 
crisis until Thailand’s Bath was under attacked and suddenly it spread expeditiously to 
other economies. 
Domestically, economy of Indonesia was funded by foreign debt in the several 
years before crisis to leverage the economy, especially private sector. Thus, when the 
currency crisis was happening, the value of rupiah was depreciated so much and the 
central bank could not afford to stabilize the value of rupiah in the market. Then a huge 
amount of the dollar-denominated short term debt was suspected to default since the 
debt value in rupiah was becoming very large.  
The inability of central bank to maintain the value of rupiah by intervening the 
market had forced Indonesia to break the rule and change the exchange regime. It was too 
costly in many aspects to maintain the same regime. Then, since July 1997 the government 
of Indonesia announced to use the free (independently) floating exchange rate and let the 
market decide the appropriate value of rupiah. There were some expectations that free 
floating exchange rate will be giving more stable economy as whole and bringing an 
autonomous mechanism inside the regime to stabilize and balance the economy. 
It has been 16 years the free floating exchange rate adopted by Indonesia and 
several complementary policies have been taken to support the objective of stabilization 
of rupiah. It is also clear that this free floating is not pure or clean; it is dirt in some degree. 
The matter then how dirty the free floating; how much the central bank is intervening the 
market. Meanwhile, there has been some economic shocks, either domestically and 
internationally, which were giving impacts in some extent to the exchange rate.  
This paper has some objectives. First, through this paper it is very important to 
begin with the description of the policy changes, from managed floating exchange rate to 
free floating exchange rate after the crisis. Second, to analyze why this change was taken 
and how the new regime performs so far. Third, to formulate the policy implication for 
the future. 
The post crisis period in this paper refers to July in 1997 when the new policy was 
announced formally by the government, until October 2013, the latest data available. 
During this period, it is inevitably there has been some economic circumstance that will 
be recognized throughout the paper. For instance, the global financial crisis in 2008, must 
had some impact in the exchange rate performance. 
 
Literature Review 
Which exchange rate regimes 
should be applied for which country has 
been remain the central debate among 
the economist for some decades. Some 
theoretical and empirical evidences have 
been proposed to argue and defend any 
of them. The conventional debate was 
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whether to fix or let it free. But, the 
recent debate is growing to some extent 
in which not to choose the two extreme 
of them, due to the reality of no evidence 
of an economy that really applying the 
extreme point. No country adopt pure or 
clean floating exchange rate as well as it 
is hard to find a country with strictly fix 
its exchange rate. Each of economy has a 
certain degree of “dirty” in applying any 
exchange rate regime. Since then, the 
discussion has been moving to what 
degree can be accepted given some other 
economic and noneconomic indicators 
in a specific country.  
 
Table 1. The Use of Exchange Rate Arrangements 
 
Source: Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein (2000) 
 
Mundel1 classifies the exchange rate mechanisms into several ranking according 
to the degree of monetary integration: 
1. Clean float (no intervention) 
2. Dirty float (flexible rate with sporadic intervention) 
3. Crawling peg (frequent mini devaluations), no adjustment mechanism 
4. Adjustable peg (infrequent devaluation), no adjustment mechanism 
5. Tablita system (crawling peg with partial adjustment) 
6. Tablita system (crawling peg with automatic adjustment) 
7. Fixed spot rates with semiautomatic adjustment mechanism (flexible forward 
rates) 
8. Fixed spot exchange rates, automatic adjustment, irrevocable parity (fixed 
forward rate) 
9. Fixed rates, automatic adjustment, fixed relationship between foreign 
exchange reserves and central bank money 
                                                          
1 Robert A. Mundell. Exchange-Rate Arrangements in the Transition Economies. Balance of Payment, 
Exchange Rates, and Competitiveness in Transition Economies, ed. Mario I. Blejer and Marko Skreb. Kluer 
Academic Publishers. (Boston, 1999-118). 
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10. Currency board system (100 percent reserves backing central bank money) 
11. Monetary union (common central bank) 
12. Common currency (monetary union plus a common currency) 
While Mundel is categorizing in the context of monetary union and currency union 
(which is the “highest” degree of fixing), Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein2 have identified the 
exchange rate arrangement into similar classification and historically divide into 4 
periods of time, as table 1 
In July 2006 IMF also has classified into several regimes based on the actual, de 
facto, exchange rate arrangement applied by its members.3 
 
Table 2. IMF Classification of de facto Exchange Rate Arrangements 
No Exchange Rate Arrangements Number of Country Percentage 
1 exchange arrangement with no separate legal 
tender 
41 22% 
2 currency board arrangements 7 4% 
3 conventional fixed peg arrangements 52 28% 
4 pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands 6 3% 
5 crawling pegs 5 3% 
6 exchange rate within crawling bands - 0% 
7 managed floating with no predetermined path for 
the exchange rate 
51 27% 
8 independently floating 25 13% 
Source: International Monetary Fund 2006. 
 
All of those data suggest that 
over time more countries have adopted 
the exchange rate arrangement that 
close to free floating system, but a 
significant number of countries are still 
using the system that close to fixed 
exchange rate.  
The data from IMF is based on 
the actual application of the exchange 
rate regime, instead of a system that has 
been announced by a country. It is 
possible that the implementation is 
different with the commitment at the 
beginning. For example A country can 
decide to use an independent free 
floating which is explicitly announced to 
the public, but for some reasons, in the 
reality there are some intervention into 
the market. Hernandez and Montiel4 
argue there are several objectives for a 
developing country to have a different de 
facto exchange rate arrangement with de 
jure: 1) fear of volatility; 2) stabilization 
                                                          
2 Jeffry Frieden, Piero Ghezzi, and Ernesto Stein. Politics and Exchange Rate in Latin America. Research 
Network Working Paper #R-42 I. Inter-American Development Bank. (Washington, 2000) 
3IMF. De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate and Monetary Framework.  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706.htm 
4 Leonardo Hernandez and Peter J. Montiel. Post-Crisis Exchange Rate Policy in Five Asian Countries: Filling 
in the “Hollow Middle’?. Paper for High Level Seminar “Exchange Rate Regimes: Hard Peg or Free Floating”, 
IMF Institute. (Washington, 2001). 
5 Andres Velasco. Exchange Rate Policies for Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? What Do We 
Still Not Know? G-24 Discussion Paper No.5. United Nation. (New York, 2000). 
of the nominal effective exchange rate; 
3), stabilization of the real effective 
exchange rate. 4), fear of depreciation. 
5), fear of appreciation. 6), accumulation 
of a reserve “war chest.” 
The fact that there are still many 
countries using the dirtier to fixed 
exchange rate, is suggesting that the 
system still has some advantages to 
offer. There are two major argument in 
favor of fixed exchange rate of hard pegs, 
as mentioned by Velasco. 5 The first 
argument is the credibility of monetary 
policy at home. If an economy has not 
enough credibility to execute its own 
monetary policy, pegging the home 
currency to any hard-money country 
with more credible monetary policy will 
enable to import its credibility to home.  
The second argument is the discipline 
argument which is saying that pegging 
exchange rate will encourage fiscal or 
monetary authority to be more 
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discipline, since any eventual collapse in 
the exchange rate would have a big 
impact on political aspect. Moreover, 
Garber and Svenson6 say that a fixed 
exchange rate could help to minimize 
instability in the real economic activities. 
But the fixed exchange rate also 
have some disadvantages, which 
sometimes come from its strength. For 
instance, pegging a currency lies in the 
absence of escape clause. In some cases 
it provides advantages, but more 
disadvantages will come if the political 
cost of abandoning the peg is not large 
enough to prevent it to be happened. In 
other side, if successfully abandoned, 
expected inflation and interest spreads 
can come down sharply. And about the 
need of discipline in applying fixed 
exchange rate due to the fear of impact 
from imprudent behavior, some argue 
that in case of free floating exchange rate 
those impact will be greater and can be 
transmitted immediately through the 
movement of exchange rate and price 
level. It means that fixed exchange rate 
does not provide the stronger tool to 
force the monetary and fiscal authority 
discipline. 7 
To make the fixed exchange rate 
works well is not easy, there are some 
requirements need be met, which are 
known as Mundell-McKinnon optimal 
currency area theory: 1) symmetric real 
shocks; 2) trade with anchor currency; 
3) flexible labor market; 4) sound, well-
capitalized, and well regulated banking  
system; 4) small countries with weak 
monetary and fiscal institution.8  
In case of free floating exchange 
rate, as Friedman9 argues the main 
advantage is if there is a shock that need 
adjustment in the real exchange rate, it 
will be faster and less costly to move the 
nominal exchange rate, in case of prices 
move slowly.  This works well in the 
countries that often have a large shock 
from abroad. As Mundell also says, “If 
shocks to the good markets are more 
prevalent than shocks to the money 
market, then a flexible exchange rate is 
preferable to a fixed rate.” 10 
Some objections to the flexible 
exchange rate have been raised, since 
the prevalence of wage indexation 
(Hausmann et al.)11, high degree of pass 
through may prevent real exchange rate 
adjustment, and the problem with the 
lack of credibility of the monetary policy. 
Weather fixed exchange rate or 
free floating exchange rate is the best for 
an economy, is still not clear and hugely 
depending on many factors. However, 
generally the optimal exchange rate 
regime is a managed float system as 
pointed out by Genberg.12 This is 
because in the managed float exchange 
rate system, money supply will react to 
exchange rate, interest rate, and other 
economic indicators.  IMF published 
some considerations need to think of 
when deciding the appropriate exchange 
rate management: 
 
Characteristic of Economy 
Implication for the Desired Degree of Exchange Rate 
Flexibility 
Size of economy The larger the economy, the stronger is the case for a 
flexible rate 
openness The more open the economy, the less attractive is a flexible 
exchange rate 
Diversified production/export structure The more diversified the economy, the more feasible is a 
flexible exchange rate 
                                                          
6 Peter M. Garber and Lars E.O Svenson. The 
Operation and Collapse of Fixed Exchange Rate 
Regimes. NBER Working Paper No. 4971. 
(Cambridge, 1994) 
7 Andres Velasco. Exchange Rate Policies for 
Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? 
What Do We Still Not Know? G-24 Discussion 
Paper No.5. United Nation. (New York, 2000). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Genberg (1989) in Peter M. Garber and Lars 
E.O Svenson. The Operation and Collapse of Fixed 
Exchange Rate Regimes. NBER Working Paper 
No. 4971. (Cambridge, 1994) 
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Geographic concentration of trade The larger the proportion of an economy’s trade with one 
large economy, the greater is the incentive to peg to the 
currency of that country 
Divergence of domestic inflation from 
world inflation 
The more divergent a country’s inflation rate from that of its 
main trading partners, the greater is the need for frequent 
exchange rate adjustments.(But for a country with 
extremely high inflation, a  fixed exchange rate may provide 
greater policy discipline and credibility to a stabilization 
program) 
Degree of economic/financial 
development 
The greater the degree of economic and financial 
development, the more feasible is a flexible exchange rate 
regime 
Labor mobility The greater the degree of labor mobility, when wages prices 
are downwardly sticky, the less difficult (and costly) is the 
adjustment to external shocks with a fixed exchange rate 
Capital mobility The higher the degree of capital mobility, the more difficult 
it is to sustain a pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate 
Foreign nominal shocks The more prevalent the foreign nominal shocks, the more 
desirable is a flexible exchange rate 
Domestic nominal shocks The more prevalent the domestic nominal shocks, the more 
attractive is a fixed exchange rate 
Real shocks The greater an economy’s susceptibility to real shocks, 
whether foreign or domestic, the more advantageous is a 
flexible exchange rate  
Credibility of policymakers The lower the anti-inflation credibility of policymakers, the 
greater is the attractiveness of a fixed exchange rate as 
nominal anchor 
Source: Rana (1998)13 
Based on Velasco,14 the implementation 
of any exchange rate regime requires 
some complementary policies to have a 
successful objectives. This strongly 
applies especially to the flexible 
exchange rate. These complementary 
regulation can be capital control, 
prudential regulation in the financial 
system, and counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.  
 
Description of the Policy Change 
A free floating exchange rate 
arrangement have been officially 
adopted by Indonesia since August 14th, 
1997. The system adopted after the 
country was hit by the biggest financial 
crisis in Indonesia. Previously, a fixed 
exchange rate was used in 1970 to 1978 
and managed floating exchange rate was 
implemented since 1978 until August 
1997. 
Under the fixed exchange rate in 
1970, Indonesia pegged the value of 
rupiah to US dollar and had a multiple 
exchange rate structure which were 
                                                          
13 Pradumna B. Rana. The East Asian Financial Crisis—Implication for Exchange Rate Management. 
Economics and Development Resources Center Briefing Notes No.5, Asian Development Bank. 1998. 
14 Andres Velasco. Exchange Rate Policies for Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? What Do We 
Still Not Know? G-24 Discussion Paper No.5. United Nation. (New York, 2000) 
consist of a Flexible General Exchange 
(DU) Rate, a Flexible Credit Foreign 
Exchange (DK) Rate, and Export Rate. At 
that time, Indonesia also began to 
liberalize its capital account by removal 
of compulsory of export proceeds. After 
continuing devaluation of rupiah 
because of US Dollar’s floating, in 1987 
Bank Indonesia overthrown the DK rate 
and introduced an Effective Rate under 
the managed floating exchange rate. The 
bands of the rate was determined based 
on a basket of currencies of Indonesia’s 
main trading partners.  
In the early 1990s, the band of 
the currency fluctuation had been 
widened for several times to make it 
more flexible and adjusting to the real 
value. The first change was taken in 
1994, a spread of plus or minus Rp15. 
And then was followed in in 1995 
(Rp22), June 1996 (Rp118 or 5%), 
September 1996 (Rp119 or 8 %), and in 
July 1997 (12%). (More detail about the 
exchange rate policies before the crisis in 
the appendix). 
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The adoption of any exchange 
rate regime mostly depends on the 
condition of a country at specific of time 
and need other complementary policies. 
Therefore, Bank Indonesia as the 
monetary authority considered to adopt 
the free floating exchange rate when the 
crisis was attacking the Indonesia’s 
rupiah. The logical consequence then a 
monetary policy anchor was not the 
exchange rate anymore and Bank 
Indonesia decide to target the money 
base operationally during the IMF 
stabilization period. But, using money 
base as target had some difficulties and 
poorly transmit to the market led to fail 
to maintain market expectation on the 
future exchange rate movement.  
Since 2005, Bank Indonesia 
adopted an inflation targeting 
framework which has three main 
characteristics: 1) monetary policy is 
directed to achieve a target of inflation 
for a specified time horizon which is 
explicitly announced to the public by 
central bank; 2) inflation targeting is 
working on a forward-looking basis by 
responding the development of inflation 
for the future trend; 3) the 
implementation of monetary policy must 
be transparent and accountable to 
ensure the credibility of the policy.15  
The next paragraphs will be 
explaining the other complementary 
policies was taken by Indonesia after 
adopting the flexible exchange rate in 
1997, including capital control, financial 
system regulation, and counter cyclical 
fiscal policy. 
During the IMF stabilization 
period from 1997 to 2003, Indonesia 
was restricted to introduce any capital 
management or measure since IMF 
program requires a client country to 
deregulate some policies and being more 
open to international exposure. There 
was found only one policy that represent 
to capital control during that period, 
                                                          
15 Burhanuddin Abdullah. Monetary and 
Exchange Rate Policy in a Global Financial 
Integration-Indonesia Experience. Paper 
presented at the South East Asia-Latin America 
and Caribbean Countries (SEACEN-LAC) 
Governors Seminar. (Kuala Lumpur, 2006). 
which was in 2001 Indonesia prohibited 
trading by domestic bank: (i) rupiah 
denominated overdraft; (ii) lending to 
non-residents; (iii) transactions or 
rupiah-denominated bonds issued by 
non-residents; (iv) rupiah trading 
among non-residents; (v) investment in 
stocks issued by non-residents in rupiah 
currency.  
Since then, there are several 
policies have been taken, as follows16: 
 2004: strict regulation on the 
reserves in rupiah in bank accounts 
 2004: reporting required for 
offshore borrowings by financial 
institutions 
 2005: short-term borrowings to be 
less than 30% of total assets: central 
bank’s approval required for long-
term external borrowings 
 2005: reserve requirement in Bank 
Indonesia account raised 
 2006: transfer of rupiah currency to 
non-residents prohibited 
 2008: requirement of repot to the 
authority on external borrowings 
from non-residents 
 2008: ceiling of conversion of rupiah 
to foreign exchange for non-
residents over $100,000 monthly 
(requirement of special approval for 
over $100,000) 
 2008: conversion of rupiah to 
foreign currency limited for current 
account transactions in principle 
 2010: requirement of holding SBI 
(Central Bank securities) more than 
1 month 
 2011: bank’s offshore short-term 
borrowing up to 30% of capital 
 2011: reserve requirement of 5 
percent of total foreign-exchange 
holdings for banks 
 2011: all transactions of bank are to 
be used by rupiah 
 
16 Hideaki Ohta. Capital Account Liberalization 
and Control in Indonesia—Effectiveness of 
Controls in the Real Economy and 
Monetary/Financial Sector. The 13th 
International Convention of the East Asian 
Economic Association. (Singapore, 2012). 
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The policy of financial system 
stability after 1997 crisis is aiming to 
regain public confidence toward the 
banking and other financial sectors. In 
doing so, Bank Indonesia has been 
pursuing the long-term financial 
stability and improving the intermediary 
function of financial system. As 
mentioned by Goeltom17, the following 
are actions were taken: 
i) Reestablish confidence in the 
financial sector by allowing a 
blanket guarantee scheme for all 
depositors, either in domestic and 
foreign currency. 
ii) Improve the internal governance of  
banks 
a. Strengthening of the legal 
framework, policies and 
infrastructure of the banking 
system. Indonesia has new laws on 
the banking system and the central 
bank since 1998 and 1999 
respectively. 
b. Strengthening of prudential 
regulations. 
iii) Rebuilding bank solvency 
a. Establishment of the Indonesian 
Banking Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) and the asset Management 
Unit (AMU).  
b. Closing-down of problem banks. 
c. Strengthening of bank capital.  
The most recent important 
policy in Indonesia’s financial system is 
the unification of financial supervisory 
agency into a single authority. 
Previously, banking system was 
supervised by Bank Indonesia as a 
central bank, and other financial system 
including capital stock market, 
insurance, and other financial institution 
were supervised by BAPEPAM-LK under 
the Ministry of Finance. The new agency 
is Financial Service Authority (Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan, OJK) has the 
responsibility in the micro prudential 
aspect of financial system, while the 
macro prudential still will be under Bank 
Indonesia’s supervision.  
                                                          
17 Miranda S. Goeltom. Capital Flows in 
Indonesia: Challenges and Policy Responses.  
In the fiscal aspect, the 
government has embarked on two steps 
in strengthening the fiscal prudence. 
First, reduce the size of foreign debt by 
promoting fiscal surplus and revenue 
from state-owned enterprises 
privatization. Second, relieve the 
government dependency on 
international borrowing by reducing 
government expenditure on investment 
and consumption. Fiscal policy at the 
crisis period was aiming to promote 
economic recovery and establish a 
strong fundamental for sustainable fiscal 
management.18 
 
Analysis and Explanation 
Why the exchange rate regime changes 
did take place? 
In one side, a successful economic 
performance in Indonesia and other 
Asian countries in early 1990s had 
invited many foreign investment. And in 
another side many industrial economies 
was having a bad performance at the 
same time. This led capital to flow to 
these Asian emerging market. The short-
term inflows were quite substantial to 
make an impact when there was a 
sudden reversal in the capital market. 
Central bank could not afford to 
intervene more under the managed 
floating exchange rate. The cost to 
maintain the band was too large, and 
eventually central bank adopted the 
flexible exchange rate. 
Since 1970, Indonesia had 
liberalized its economy and was 
becoming more open to international 
financial system which was getting more 
integrated between countries. The 
consequences of this openness was 
Indonesia has recorded a financial 
account surplus from that period until 
before crisis in 1997. The average 
financial account surplus from year 1980 
to 1996 was USD4,886 million per year. 
The most problematic was the 
increasing of net capital flows into 
private sector, while at the same time net 
Bank of International Settlement Papers No. 44. 
(Geneva). 
18 Ibid. 
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capital flows to government was 
decreasing (see the table below). 
 
This massive capital flow was also supported by the weak performance of 
industrialized economies which was led to accommodative monetary policies, abundant 
liquidity, and low interest rate, and rise in stock market. All of them were reducing the 
asset yield in those industrial countries and made the emerging market, especially Asian 
market, an increasingly attractive investment opportunity. The graphs below are showing 
the  yield spread in Europe and Asia countries. 
 
Secondary Market Yield Spreads on U.S. Dollar-Denominated Eurobonds1 
 
(In percent a year) 
 
The central bank was forced to widen the intervention band in response to out-
of-control capital inflows into the economy. This policy was aiming to send a signal to the 
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market in predicting future movement in the nominal exchange rate. But, the amount of 
capital inflows was too large and always drive the nominal exchange rate to the bottom 
of limit of the decided intervention band (see graph below). 
 
 
 
When the Thailand’s currency crisis started to spill over to Indonesia, there was a 
massive sudden reversal of capital, the managed floating exchange rate regime was under 
problem because the market intervention will be hugely expensive, monetary 
sterilization was becoming less effective and also increase the quasi-fiscal cost of 
monetary policy operations. Widening to intervention band was not enough and the 
eventually central bank decided to adopt the flexible exchange rate on August 14, 1997.  
 
How well the policies has been worked? 
Almost all countries who adopting de jure free exchange rate system actually do 
not eliminate the intervention policy to maintain the stability of exchange rate.19 The 
intervention are carried on both through intervention in the foreign exchange market 
directly or indirectly by using the interest rate channel. That’s why there are some gap 
between de jure and de facto exchange rate regime. In the recent literature there has been 
growing the methodology to identify such a gap based on the outcomes in the exchange 
rate, foreign exchange reserves, and domestic interest rate fluctuations. As suggested by 
Hernandez and Montiel 20 a fixed bilateral peg would exhibit no exchange rate variation 
outside a very narrow band (conventionally taken as +/- 2.25 percent). In this part, I am 
going to refers to the research have been done by Hernandez & Montiel (2001) and Calvo 
& Rainhart (2000)21 for the case of Indonesia. 
Exchange rate volatility 
                                                          
19 As posited by Calvo and Rainhart in Burhanudin Abdullah, Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in a Global 
Financial Integration-Indonesia Experience. Paper presented at the South East Asia-Latin America and 
Caribbean Countries (SEACEN-LAC) Governors Seminar. (Kuala Lumpur, 2006). 
20 Leonardo Hernandez and Peter J. Montiel. Post-Crisis Exchange Rate Policy in Five Asian Countries: Filling 
in the “Hollow Middle’?. Paper for High Level Seminar “Exchange Rate Regimes: Hard Peg or Free Floating”, 
IMF Institute. (Washington, 2001). 
21 Ibid. 
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Source: International Financial Statistic, IMF (2013) 
 
In the figure above is showing the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against US 
dollar, for both before and after crisis. Graphically, we can easily understand the 
comparison of movement of rupiah before and after crisis. More fluctuation of course can 
be seen after the crisis period. 
The following table is the summary of Hernandez and Calvo & Reinhart’s research 
on monthly fluctuation of exchange rate before and after the Asian Crisis for case of 
Indonesia and compare to the countries with more clear floating exchange rate: 
 
Monthly Fluctuations in Exchange Rate 
Country 
Hernandez and Montiel Calvo and Reinhart 
Period Range Std. Dev Period 
+/-1% 
band 
+/-2.5% 
band 
U.S. $/DM 
Aug 95 – Jun 97 0.083 0.024 Feb 73 – 
Apr 99 
26.8 58.7 
Jan 99 – Nov 00 0.078 0.021 
U.S. $/Yen 
Aug 95 – Jun 97 0.147 0.030 Feb 73 – 
Apr 99 
33.8 61.2 
Jan 99 – Nov 00 0.084 0.028 
Indonesia 
Aug 95 – Jun 97 0.033 0.007 
Nov 78 – 
Jun 97 
96.4 99.1 
Jan 99 – Nov 00 0.230 0.063 
Jul 97 – Apr 
99 
9.5 14.3 
 
Based on the Hernandez and Montiel’s research, before the crisis Indonesia had 
more stable exchange rate compare to the clean floaters (the US, Germany, and Japan). It 
suggests that Indonesia actively defended the exchange rate of rupiah against US dollar. 
This conclusion is clear since in that period Indonesia was adopting the managed free 
floating exchange rate. In the post-crisis period, when Indonesia had adopted the flexible 
exchange rate, it was confirmed that the exchange rate of rupiah against US dollar was 
much more volatile than the clean floaters. From the table obviously shows the difference 
of range before and after crisis period is quite substantial. From this point of view, we can 
say that Indonesia have become “clean” floaters. 
While from the research of Calvo and Reinhart, it suggested that Indonesia pegged 
its exchange rate and intervened so heavily in the pre-crisis period. But, it was changed 
after the crisis, when Indonesia have intervene so much less than before the crisis. They 
concluded then that Indonesia has been successfully transformed from “fixers” to 
“floaters’. 
 
Exchange reserve volatility 
The next indicator of exchange rate policy is the exchange reserves fluctuations. 
Central banking intervenes the foreign exchange market using the stock of exchange 
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reserves. By analyzing the fluctuation in exchange reserve stocks volatility, we will get the 
indication of how much central bank intervening the market. When the stock of exchange 
reserves are stable over period of time, we might expect that central banking is allowing 
the foreign exchange to absorb the impact of shocks. Otherwise, central banking is still 
controlling the market too much. The following table is showing its measurement using 
mean absolute change and standard deviation in Hernandez and Montiel’s research and 
plus minus 1 and 2.5 percent of band in the research done by Calvo and Reihart. 
 
Monthly Fluctuations in Exchange Reserves 
Country 
Hernandez and Montiel Calvo and Reinhart 
Period 
Mean 
Absolute 
Change 
Std. Dev Period 
+/-1% 
band 
+/-2.5% 
band 
U.S  
Feb 73 – 
Apr 99 
26.8 62.2 
Germany 
Aug 95 – Jun 97 1.082 1.325 
 
Jan 99 – Nov 00 1.225 1.535 
Japan 
Aug 95 – Jun 97 1.488 2.469 Feb 73 – 
Apr 99 
44.8 74.3 
Jan 99 – Nov 00 2.193 2.948 
Indonesia 
Aug 95 – Jun 97 2.038 2.892 
Nov 78 – 
Jun 97 
22.8 41.5 
Jan 99 – Nov 00 3.169 5.335 
Jul 97 – Apr 
99 
10 29.9 
 
In case of Hernandez and Montiel found exchange reserve volatility increased 
after the crisis as the mean absolute change was 3.169, from 2.038 in the pre-crisis period. 
It means that central bank had been intervening a lot in the market. This result is not 
consistent with the adoption of the flexible exchange rate regime which requires less (or 
no) intervention from the central bank. They argued that the assumption of a uniform 
volatility shocks is likely to have been violated in the case of Indonesia.  
The methodology used by Calvo and Reinhart is suggesting that for floaters a high 
percentage of reserve changes should be contained within narrow band. In the case of 
Indonesia, the same surprising result was also found where the exchange reserve seems 
to be more fluctuate after the crisis than before.  
 
Domestic interest rate volatility 
 
Monthly Fluctuations in Nominal Interest Rate 
Country 
Hernandez and Montiel Calvo and Reinhart (basis point) 
Period Range 
Mean Absolute 
Change 
Std. 
Dev 
Period 
< 
25 
< 
50 
> 
400 
> 
500 
U.S  
Feb 73 – 
Apr 99 
59.7 80.7 0.3 0.3 
German
y 
Aug 95 – 
Jun 97 
0.53 0.08 0.12 
 
Jan 99 – 
Nov 00 
0.68 0.13 0.16 
Japan 
Aug 95 – 
Jun 97 
0.34 0.03 0.07 
Feb 73 – 
Apr 99 
67.9 86.4 0 0 
Jan 99 – 
Nov 00 
0.27 0.02 0.05 
Indonesi
a 
Aug 95 – 
Jun 97 
4.97 0.87 1.21 
Nov 78 – 
Jun 97 
30.6 46.8 5.2 4 
Jan 99 – 
Nov 00 
12.19 2.01 3.12 
Jul 97 – 
Apr 99 
0 0 75 70.1 
 
The final indicator is fluctuation of the domestic interest rate. The more fluctuate 
exchange rate would be associated with smaller fluctuation in the domestic interest rate, 
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under assumption of the uniformity of shocks across countries and over time, and also 
that shock arise from credibility effects. For this analysis, Hernandez and Montiel are 
measuring in term of range of monthly fluctuation, its mean absolute change, and its 
standard deviations. While Calvo and Reinhart are using basis point fluctuations. 
 
From both research, the 
important finding is interest rate 
volatility increased in the post-crisis 
period for Indonesia, suggesting that 
period has not a tranquil one in the 
exchange market.  
 
Exchange Rate policy under Inflation 
Targeting Framework and its 
effectiveness 
Since the adoption of inflation 
targeting framework, the main objective 
of monetary is to achieve the inflation 
target. Any monetary policy related to 
exchange rate is aiming to support and 
part of the whole such a monetary 
framework. Exchange rate movement in 
Indonesia does not always represent the 
fundamental value of rupiah, especially 
during the financial crisis 2008 when 
there were massive capital inflow form 
developed countries. Excessive 
exchange rate movement has significant 
impact on domestic economy including 
financial stability, so interest rate policy 
is not enough to manage the exchange 
rate volatility. 
Therefore, exchange rate policy 
(intervention) must be part of the whole 
monetary policy framework in achieving 
price stability. There are five policy 
instrument: 1) interenst rate policy; 2) 
exchange rate policy; 3) management of 
capital flows; 4) macro prudential 
policy; 5) monetary policy 
communication. The objective of the 
exchange rate policy itself is to stabilize 
the exchange rate along its fundamental 
and it more support the price stability 
and financial system stability than to 
maintain external competitiveness. 
Operationally, there are three steps need 
to be taken: 1) develop a methodology to 
assess the exchange rate fundamental 
and its determining factor; 2) simulate 
                                                          
22 Perry Warjiyo. Indonesia: Stabilizing he Exchange Rate along Its Fundamental. Bank of International 
Settlement Papers No.73.  
23 Ibid. 
the factors to assess its consistency; 3) 
make the decision of exchange rate 
policy that consistent with the objective 
of the inflation target.22 
To conduct the exchange rate 
intervention, according to Warjiyo there 
are aspect need to be considered. First, 
the types of international investors; 
hedge fund (usually short term) or long 
term investors. The short term investors 
tend to create exchange rate volatility 
while the long run investors are more 
stable. Second, the determining factors 
that affect changes in international 
investors’ behavior. Based on these two 
consideration, central bank is focusing 
on to provide a climate that is attractive 
to long-term investors to stabilize the 
exchange rate along its fundamental. In 
the operational level, the intervention is 
conducted through agent banks to buy 
and sell foreign currency (most US 
dollar) depending on excess supply or 
demand condition in the market.  
The effectiveness of exchange 
rate intervention must be in line with the 
monetary policy objective in 
maintaining price stability. In the 
medium to long term, Indonesia is able 
to manage the volatility of exchange rate 
and ensure a path that is consistent with 
the price stability objective. This is 
reflected by the depreciation of rupiah 
from 2008 to 2011, reflecting the overall 
macroeconomic developments during 
the period. In the short term, the 
effectiveness of the policy is hugely 
depending on the credibility of 
communication by central bank to 
influence market expectation on 
exchange rate and inflation.23 
 
Implication 
There some policy 
recommendation need to be considered 
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in maintaining the objective of flexible 
exchange rate: 
1. Exchange rate policy should be part 
of the monetary policy as a whole 
2. Financial system regulation and 
prudential must be strengthened to  
prevent the volatility of exchange 
rate 
3. Credibility of monetary authority 
should be maintained to be able to 
influence the market expectation 
toward the exchange rate path in 
the future. 
4. Capital control policy should be 
well-managed to maintain the 
balance between the benefit and 
potential risk of capital inflow. In 
this developing stages, Indonesia 
still need a lot investment, but it is 
important to make sure those 
investment are less risky. 
 
Conclusion 
The choice of exchange rate 
regime is depending on many thing such 
as size of economy, openness, export 
structure, geographic concentration, 
domestic inflation, financial 
development, labor mobility, capital 
mobility, foreign and domestic nominal 
shock and real shocks, and also credulity 
of policymakers.  
Any exchange rate regime, from 
the hard peg to the independently free 
floating, are still subject to some 
problems (on its own) that will hamper 
the objective the exchange rate policy. 
Therefore, exchange rate policy should 
be complemented by another policy, 
such as capital control, strengthening 
financial regulation, and fiscal 
institution. 
In case of Indonesia, exchange 
rate policy is part of monetary policy as 
whole, which is inflation targeting. It is 
clear that Indonesia does not adopt the 
pure free floating exchange rate and do 
some intervention in foreign exchange 
market. So, intervention of exchange rate 
is aiming to maintain the exchange rate 
along its fundamental value and 
consistent with the monetary objective 
to stabilize price level. Up to know, these 
policy mix are able to achieve price 
stability and financial stability in the 
medium and long term. Although in the 
short term it is difficult to prevent the 
exchange rate volatility.  
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Appendix 
 
Date Changes to the exchange rate regime 
Indonesian 
Rupiah per 
U.S. Dollar 
17 April 
1970 
The Indonesian Rupiah (Rp) was devalued to a new Flexible General 
Exchange Rate, or Devisa Umum (DU), of Rp378.00 per U.S. Dollar. 
A subsidiary Flexible Credit Foreign Exchange Rate, or Devisa Kredit (DK), 
of Rp326.00 per U.S. Dollar was created. 
These changes represented a simplification and merging the multiple 
exchange system of the Export Bonus (BE) Certificate Rate and the 
Complementary Foreign Exchange (DP) Rate, and formed the basis of the 
exchange rate structure. (WCY 1984, p.357) 
The 10% exchange tax on export proceeds was introduced.  
378.000  
10 
December 
1970 
The exchange rate was unified by the elimination of the Flexible Credit 
Foreign Exchange Rate (DK). The Flexible General Exchange (DU) Rate 
became applicable to all exchange transactions. (WCY 1984, p.357)  
  
23 August 
1971 
Following the floating of the U.S. Dollar on 15 August 1971, the Rupiah was 
devalued 8.9% in terms of gold from Rp378.00 to Rp415.00 per American 
unit. 
The Flexible Credit Foreign Exchange (DK) Rate was reintroduced, creating 
a multiple exchange rate structure. (WCY 1984, p.357) 
In the Jakarta foreign exchange Bourse, transactions in U.S. Dollars had 
been effected at the rate within 1% either side of Rp415 per U.S. Dollar. 
(IMF 1976, p.235)  
415.000  
20 
December 
1971 
The gold content of Rupiah reduced by 7.89% because of devaluation of U.S. 
Dollar. (WCY 1984, p.357)  
  
14 
February 
1973 
Indonesia announced that the Official Rate, or Flexible General Foreign 
Exchange (DU) Rate, of Rp415.00 per U.S. Dollar would remain unchanged, 
Rupiah devaluated by 10% in terms of gold. (WCY 1984, p.357)  
  
12 June 
1974 
The 10% exchange tax on export proceeds was replaced by a 10% tax on 
the export value of most shipments abroad, retaining the Export Rate of 
Rp374.00 per U.S. Dollar. (WCY 1984, p.357)  
  
1 April 
1976 
The export tax was changed to 5%-10% depending on commodity. (WCY 
1984, p.357)  
  
16 
November 
1978 
The Flexible Credit Foreign Exchange (DK) Rate was abolished. (WCY 1984, 
p.357) 
The exchange rate of the Rupiah was depreciated by 33.6%, adjusted from 
Rp415.00 to Rp625.00 per U.S. Dollar. At the same time, the Rupiah's link to 
the U.S. Dollar was severed and the Bank Indonesia had set the middle rate 
each day using a basket of currencies of Indonesia's main trading partners 
as one of the variables. 
625.000  
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An Effective Rate was established on a controlled, floating basis. 
Transactions in the Jakarta Foreign Exchange Bourse were effected at rates 
within 1% either side of the middle rate of the Rupiah. (IMF 1979, p.212)  
29 January 
1979 
The facility given to foreign exchange banks to conclude swap transactions 
with Bank Indonesia was extended to include nonbank financial 
institutions. Each foreign exchange bank and nonbank financial institution 
was subject to a ceiling set by Bank Indonesia. (IMF 1980, p.202)  
  
4 August 
1979 
An additional export tax of 20% was established. (WCY 1984, p.357)    
30 March 
1983 
The effective Rate for the Indonesian Rupiah was depreciated 27.6%, from 
Rp702 to Rp970 per U.S. Dollar. (Prawiro, p.223) 
Bank Indonesia announced that it would continue to follow a policy of 
managed float, and would consider a broader set of currencies in 
determining the exchange rate of Rupiah. (IMF 1984, p.260)  
  
1 January 
1984 
The MPO tax on imports and exports was abolished. (WCY 1985, p.401)    
12 
September 
1986 
The Effective Rate for the Rupiah was devalued 31% in terms of U.S. Dollar. 
It was changed from Rp1134 to Rp1664.00 per U.S. Dollar. (IMF 1987, 
p.277)  
1,664.000  
24 October 
1986 
Five export taxes were fixed at 0%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 30%, with the 
provision that certain exports were subject to an extra export tax. (IMF 
1987, p.278)  
  
25 October 
1986 
The ceiling on foreign currency swaps between commercial banks and 
Bank Indonesia was lifted. However, the amount of swap must not exceed 
the foreign loan received by the commercial bank. The premium on the 
swap was set by the Bank Indonesia at the fixed rate of 9%. (IMF 1987, 
p.278)  
  
27 October 
1988 
The premium applicable to operations under the official swap facility 
would be set according to the difference between the average domestic 
deposit rate and LIBOR for the relevant period. For swap transactions with 
maturities exceeding 1 year, the premium would be established only for the 
first 12 months. The Government would not provide any commitment on 
the size of the premium for the subsequent period. (IMF 1989, p.237)  
  
31 March 
1989 
Following the IMF classification, Indonesia was classified under managed 
floating. (Ariff, p.155)  
  
30 April 
1989 
Foreign exchange banks were required to limit their daily net open position 
on foreign exchange to less than 25% of their own capital. Banks exceed 
this limit on net open position would be subject to a sanction. 
Controls on foreign exchange banks' offshore borrowing, which was 
previously subject to approval by Bank Indonesia, were lifted. (IMF 1990, 
p.234)  
  
16 
September 
1989 
The exchange rate system was revised. The Effective Rate, based on a 
managed float, would apply only to certain transactions undertaken at 
certain times of the day. An Interbank Free Rate, which was determined 
between banks, would govern all other transactions. (WCY 1990/93, 
p.439)  
  
1 March 
1991 
Bank Indonesia ceased to accept swaps for one-month and shorter 
maturities, and reduced banks' overall limits to 20% from 25% of capital. 
(IMF 1992, p.234)  
  
1 
November 
1991 
Banks were required to keep the net open position in foreign currency 
including their off-balance-sheet accounts at or below 20% of capital. 
The swap facility was modified. Two categories of swaps were created: 
liquidity swaps (with maturities of up to 2 years) and investment swaps 
(with 2-3 years' maturities). 
Bank Indonesia gave up the obligation to accept swaps with maturities of 
less than 2 years. (IMF 1992, p.234)  
  
16 
September 
1992 
The Central Bank increased the spread between its buying and selling rates 
for the U.S. Dollar to Rp10 from Rp6 per U.S. Dollar. (WCY 1990/93, p.439)  
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1 
November 
1993 
The exchange rate in Bank Indonesia's daily squaring session in the 
afternoon was allowed to deviate from the indicative rate posted in the 
morning by Rp2 a day (previously, the deviation was allowed up to Rp1 a 
day). (IMF 1994, p.240)  
  
6 
September 
1994 
Bank Indonesia announced daily buying and selling rates that were 
computed on the basis of a basket of weighted currencies with a spread of 
plus or minus Rp15. 
The limits on banks' open positions were liberalized, banks were required 
to meet a net open position of 25% of capital instead of 20%, and the open 
position requirement would no longer apply to individual currencies. (IMF 
1995, p.238)  
  
30 June 
1995 
Bank Indonesia announced that buying and selling rates computed on the 
basis of a basket of weighted currencies with a spread of plus or minus 
Rp22. (IMF 1996, p.237)  
  
17 July 
1995 
Bank Indonesia terminated the provision of investment swaps. (IMF 1996, 
p.237)  
  
1 January 
1996 
The Bank Indonesia (BI) within a system of managed float determined the 
exchange rate. The system was based on a daily announcement of 
"conversion rate band" (for official transactions with foreign exchange 
banks, the government and supranational institutions), and an 
"intervention band" (consisted of buying and selling rates that were 
computed on the basis of a basket of currencies). (IMF 1998, p.433)  
  
13 June 
1996 
The spread of the intervention band was increased to Rp118 (5%) from 
Rp66. (IMF 1997, p.403)  
  
10 
September 
1996 
The spread of the intervention band was increased to Rp192, 
approximately 8%. (IMF 1997, p.403)  
  
11 July 
1997 
The intervention band was widening to 12% from 8%. (IMF 1998, p.433)    
14 August 
1997 
The managed floating exchange regime was replaced by a free- floating 
exchange rate arrangement. (IMF 1998, p.439)  
  
28 
February 
1998 
A foreign exchange subsidy for food was introduced, which led to the 
reclassification of the exchange rate system from unitary to dual. (IMF 
1999, p.422)  
  
 
 
Source: Historical Exchanger Rate Regime in Asian Countries 
http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/exchange_rate_regime/index.php?cid=6 
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Table１： Capital and foreign exchange liberalization and controls (Indonesia)
Year
1989 Deregulation of ceiling of offshore trading by banks/financial instituions
1989 Foreign investors allowed up to 49％ shares
1989 Restriction of net open position(NPO) for forex trading banks/non-banks
1991 Banks' offshore borrowing up to 20％ of capital (←25％）；
premium for swap for 3 months raised 5%
1991 Approval required for external borrowings by national banks/public corp.
1991 Restriction of the net open positions(NPO) for forex trading banks/non-banks
1992 Allowed foreign investors to acquire a majority of share in commercial banks
1994 Approval required for commericial banks' external borrowins
1994 Deregulation on the net open positions(NPO) for forex trading banks/non-banks
1994 Deregulation on the external commercial borrowings
1995 Restriction on the external borrowings more than 2 years;
 The share of capital by non-residents to be less than 30％
1996 Foreign investment in mutual funds allowed in 100％ foreign owned capital
1997 Future trading of forex to be restrcted less than US$5 million
1997 Liberalization on investment in domestic shares by foreign investors (except banking sector)
1998 Deregulation of prohibited business sectors in FDI
1999  Govt approval not required for M&A
2001 Deregulation on lending of foreign currencies to non-residents by domestic banks
2001 Trading by the domestic banks prohibited;(i)Rupiah denominated overdraft;
(ii)Lending to non-residents; (iii)Transactions of Rupiah-denominated bonds issued 
by non-residents;(iv) Rupiah trading among non-residents; 
(v) Investment in stocks issued by non-residents in Rupiah currency
2004 Stirct regulation on the Reserves in Rupiah in bank accounts 
2004 Reporting required for offshore borrowings by financial institutions
2005 Short-term borrowings to be less than 30％ of total assets; 
Central Bank(Bank Indonesia)'s approval required for lon-term external borrowings
2005 Reserve requirement in Bank Indonesia account raised
2005 Deregulation in Lending in foreign currencies to non-residents by domesitc banks
2006 Transfers of Rupiah currency to non-residents prohibited
2008 Requirement of report to the Authority on external borrowings from non-residents 
2008 Ceiling of conversion of Rupiah to foreign exchange for non-residents over $100,000 monthly 
(requirement of special approval for over $100,000)
2008 Conversiton of Rupiah to foreign currency limited for current account transactions in principle
2010 Requirement of holding SBI(Central Bank securities) more than 1 month.
2011 Banks' offshore short-term borrowing up to 30％ of capital
Reserve requirement  of 5 percent of  total foreign-exchange holdings for Banks
All transactions of Banks are to be used by Rupiah
Note: The shaded area shows foreign exchange and capital controls/regulations
Sources: Author based on the resources (JETRO, Aramaki&Karikomi (2007)、Magud&Reinhart(2006), other )
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